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Spreading the Joy? Why the Machinery of Consciousness is (Probably) 






Is consciousness all in the head, or might the minimal physical substrate for 
some forms of conscious experience include goings on in the (rest of the) body 
and the world? Such a view might be dubbed (by analogy with Clark and 
Chalmers (1998) claims concerning ‘the extended mind’) ‘the extended 
conscious mind’. In this paper I review a variety of arguments for the extended 
conscious mind, and find them flawed. Arguments for extended cognition, I 





1. A Radical Response 
 
Consciousness is puzzling. So puzzling, indeed, as to lead Jerry Fodor to assert 
that:  
 
[We don’t know], even to a first glimmer, how a brain (or anything else 
that is physical) could manage to be a locus of conscious experience. 
This ... is, surely, among the ultimate metaphysical mysteries; don’t bet 
on anybody ever solving it. (Fodor 1998, p. 83) 
 
 Colin McGinn is no more optimistic, claiming that: 
 
It is not that we know what would explain consciousness but are having 
trouble finding the evidence to select one explanation over the others; 
rather, we have no idea what an explanation of consciousness would 
even look like. (McGinn 1991, p. 61) 
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In recent years, however, some theorists (both within philosophy and cognitive 
science) have begun to suspect that our puzzlement may have a rather 
unexpected source. Perhaps, they suggest, we are simply looking in the wrong place 
for the mechanisms whose action explains the conscious mind. In particular, 
the suspicion is growing that the explanation of our qualitative mental life (the 
elusive 'what-it-is-likeness'i that seems to characterize a subject’s experience of 
a certain kind of redness, of a certain voice, or of a pain in her stomach) has 
been hampered by a kind of blinkered vision that too firmly divides the neural 
from the extra-neural (gross bodily and environmental) realms. Such a view is 
prominent in, for example, recent collaborative work by the neuroscientist 
Diego Cosmelli and the philosopher Evan Thompson. Their radical but 
intriguing suggestion is that switching our explanatory focus from the brain to 
the embodied and situated brain (the-brain-plus-other-physical-stuff) will help 
turn the mystery into a (mere) puzzle, since ‘the processes crucial for 
consciousness are not confined to the brain but include the body embedded in 
the environment’ (Cosmelli and Thompson, forthcoming, ms p.1).  
 
Nor are they a lone voice. Similar claims can be found in Varela, Thompson, 
and Rosch (1991), Van Gelder and Port (1995), Hurley (1998), Thompson and 
Varela (2001), Hurley and Noë (2003), Noë and Thompson (2004a, b), and 
Noë (2008). Driving this emerging view, it seems to me, are arguments and 
considerations drawn from three related, and increasingly popular, areas: the 
depiction of mind as essentially dynamic and ‘process-like’ in nature (Kelso, 
1995, 2002), the development of the ‘enactive’ model of perception (O'Regan 
and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004), and arguments for the ‘extended mind’ (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2007).  
 
The attraction of a situated approach to consciousness are hard to 
underestimate. As one (skeptical) commentator recently put it: 
 
Consciousness is trendy … embodiment and situated cognition are also 
trendy … both topics are exciting and being exciting is an additive 
property. An embodied/situated theory of consciousness is the 
philosophical equivalent of a blockbuster …’. (Prinz 2009, p. 419) 
 
In what follows, I assess the arguments (more cautiously, those arguments 
rooted in dynamic and enactive conceptions of mind) meant to favour an 
extended (more-than-neural) physical basis for conscious experience. I 
                                                 




conclude that most of these arguments visibly fail. One argument (concerning 
complex dynamic entanglement) does better, but seems threatened by some 
uncooperative empirical facts. I conclude that as things stand, there are no 
good reasons (of a dynamical, enactive, stripe) to endorse the vision of an 
extended conscious mind. 
 
2. The Extended Mind 
 
Clark and Chalmers (1998), offer an argument designed to show that cognition 
and mental states may, in human agents, sometimes depend on material 
mechanisms that extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and central 
nervous system. Some of these mechanisms may involve gross bodily structures 
(the cognitive role of gesture is a possible real-world case (Clark, 2007, 2008)), 
while others may involve extra-bodily resources such as computers and even 
good old-fashioned notebooks.  Believers in the extended mindii (henceforth, 
EM) allow, importantly, for vast swathes of content-shaping causal contact 
between brain, (the rest of the) body, and world. Body, world, and action quite 
plainly shape and structure the contents of mind and of experience. But the 
EM hypothesis denies that this exhausts the potential role of well-matched 
non-neural resources in determining at least some of the mental and cognitive 
states and processes of an individual agent. Instead, in some cases, body and 
world are said to play what Hurley (1998), usefully describes as a non-
instrumental role: they form part of the actual machinery of mind, acting as the 
so-called ‘physical vehicles’ (more on which below) of certain mental states and 
contents. Thus, the fact that moving the head brings something new into view 
and thus alters our mental states is not in itself surprising, and it should not 
incline us to endorse any claims about bodily extended vehicles for the new 
contents thus made available. For those new contents may still be encoded or 
carried by the altered patterns of purely neural activity caused by turning the 
head. Such merely causal dependence (of the mental upon the bodily or 
environmental) is what Hurley means by ‘instrumental dependence’. By 
contrast, the ensuing neural activity might be thought to be sufficient for the 
agent to come to believe (for example) that there is now a pink elephant in the 
room. This is the kind of non-instrumental involvement of material structure 
(sometimes called ‘constitutive involvement’ (Block, 2005)) that is at issue in 
debates concerning cognitive extension. EM claims that this kind of 
constitutive involvement, commonly (though not universally) granted to the 
neural activities underlying mental states and processes, can (under some 
                                                 
ii They include, though with differing perspectives and emphases, Haugeland (1998), Dennett (1996), Wilson 
(2004 ), Hutchins (1995, in press), Wheeler (2005, in press), Menary (2007), Tribble (2005), Sutton (2002), Noë 
(2004), Rowlands (2003, 2006), and Hurley (1998). 
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circumstances) also characterize the role of key extra-neural material structures. 
Examples might include the well-integrated use of a notebook as a non-neural 
data store (Clark and Chalmers, 1998), or those uses of hand and arm gestures 
that (it has more recently been suggested) are active elements in the 
construction of trains of thought and reason (Goldin-Meadow, 2003; McNeill, 
2005; Clark, 2007).  
 
It is important to noticeiii that all the claims at issue in this debate are claims 
about what are sometimes described as the ‘vehicles’ of mental states and 
processes. They are not claims about their contents or about how mental states 
present the world to the subject. Thus suppose you have a thought whose 
content is that the beach is distant. The thought is about extra-neural states of 
affairs. But the circuitry whose whirrings and grindings realize the thinking is, 
rather plausibly, entirely local. It consists, at least on most contemporary 
materialist models, in patterns of activity in neural populations. These neural 
populations, thus active, may be said to provide the local material vehicles of 
the mental content (for some discussions of the vehicle/content distinction, 
and its importance for theories such as EM (Hurley, 2003, forthcoming). 
 
The EM thesis aims to put pressure on this received image of the ‘brain-bound’ 
(Clark 2008, p. xxv-xxix) nature of the material vehicles of mind and cognition. 
EM is thus the claim that the local material vehicles of some aspects of human 
cognition may, at times, be spread across brain, body, and world. This also (and 
we will pursue this strand in much more detail below) emerges as the claim that 
the local operations that realize some human cognizings include (possibly quite 
complex) tangles of feedback, feedforward and feedaround loops that 
promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body and world.  
 
The key case of human mental extension treated in Clark and Chalmers (1998), 
concerned the potential role of extra-neural structures (such as a fluently 
deployed, constantly available notebook) as apt for inclusion among the 
material vehicles of some of an agent’s non-occurrent (dispositional or 
‘standing’) beliefs. Otherwise put, inscriptions in the notebook figure as part of 
the physical supervenience base for certain standing beliefs of the agent. Very 
roughly the argument was that for the normally ecologically situated brain it 
often does not matter whether information is stored in the head or left out in 
the world, just so long as the right information is retrieved or reconstructed at 
the right time, so as to govern actions in much the way we normally associate 
with antecedently holding the standing belief in question (Clark, 2008). 
                                                 
iii Thanks to Keith Allen for reminding me of this. 
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The arguments in Clark and Chalmers (1998), and more recently in Clark 
(2008), thus aimed to show that whether a human individual counts as believing 
some fact is not simply a matter of whether it is stored in your biological 
memory (imagine if it was, but was totally inaccessible to recall), so much as a 
matter of whether the information thus encoded is appropriately poised for the 
guidance of behaviour. More generally, skin and skull do not, to use another 
phrase from Hurley (1998), form a ‘magical membrane’ within which (and only 
within which) real cognitive mechanisms (genuine vehicles of mental content) 
can be found. Clark and Chalmers thus defended a form of ‘active externalism’ 
in which (quite unlike standard philosophical externalisms about content) the 
relevant parts of the world are right there in the loop, active in the here-and-
now. Such active externalism is easily distinguished from the more standard 
varieties of externalismiv (such as those suggested by Putnam (1975) and Burge 
(1979, 1986)) since on the active version, were we (say, in some organismic 
twin) to retain the in-head structure but alter or remove the extended structure, 
the gross behaviour of the agent will change.  
 
I do not propose to defend either active externalism or the extended mind 
thesis (EM) in the present treatment. But it has sometimes seemed that there 
must be a direct route from claims concerning the extended mind to claims 
concerning extended physical bases for the conscious mind (henceforth ECM). 
Thus Noë and Thompson write that: 
 
Externalism about the vehicles of content (advocated in print by Hurley, 
1998; Hurley and Noë, 2003; Rowlands, 2002, 2003; Clark and Chalmers, 
1998; and Noë, 2004a,c), however does entail that neural systems are not 
sufficient for consciousness. (Noë and Thompson 2004a, p.94) 
 
Notice that in the case of ECM, just as in the case of EM, what is at issue is the 
location of the material vehicles of certain mental or cognitive states. But 
whereas EM was concerned only with the vehicles of non-conscious mental 
states such as states of dispositional believing, ECM makes the even more 
striking claim that the local material vehicles of some of our conscious 
experiences might include more than the whirrings and grindings of the 
brain/CNS (Central Nervous System). 
 
This focus on material vehicles (rather than on contents) also explains why 
there can be no simple inference from facts such as the presence of a feeling of 
                                                 
iv Active externalism is in fact orthogonal to the more passive varieties. See Clark and Chalmers (1998). 
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pain ‘in the tooth’ to the conclusion that the apparatus underlying the 
conscious experience is (in the relevant sense) extendedv. For the question is 
not whether the states of affairs that the conscious thought concerns are extra-
neural: they nearly always are. Nor is it a question about what individuates the 
thought as, for example, a thought about a tooth. What ECM – at least, the 
versions of ECM that I am setting out to target – sets out to challenge is a view 
about the location of the material underpinnings that enable the thought or 
experience to occur. It is a question about what might be dubbed the 
machinery of mind. 
 
To take a simple example, perceived motion is not itself ‘in the head’: the 
motion is (usually at least) in the world. But we may still ask about the location 
of the material vehicles of motion perception. This is a question about the 
nature and location of the physical activity that realizes motion detection. It is 
this activity that is typically considered to occur ‘in the head’. Indeed, key 
elements of this machinery look to be even further localizable, to area MT, 
which can be selectively damaged so that the world is then perceived as a set of 
static moments (Marcar, Zihi, and Cowey, 1997). Where standard views in 
contemporary neuroscience depict all such key (local mechanistic) activity as 
taking place in the head/CNS, ECM intriguingly suggests that – for some 
forms of conscious experience at least – we should explore a larger material 
canvass, one that includes processing loops that reach out to embrace states or 
activity in the (non-neural) body and world.  
 
It is this kind of claim that I want to examine. I hope to show that nothing in 
the arguments for EM should incline us to accept ECM (to accept an extended 
view of the mechanisms of the conscious mind or of the vehicles of conscious 
experience), that none of the other arguments offered by the proponents of the 
‘processing loop’ versions of ECM fill in the gap, and that there is at least one 
good reason to think that no such argument (none predicated, that is, on the 
complexity or nature of the processing loops themselves) will be forthcoming.  
 
It is worth stressing that the rejection of such  ‘processing loop’ arguments 
leaves open the possibility of other (one might say, ‘more metaphysical’) 
arguments that might be thought to support something akin to ECM : for 
example, the arguments put forward by ‘naive realists’ (Martin, 2002, 2004) 
about perception. Those arguments offer a very different picture of the terrain, 
and might threaten (if successful) to blur the vehicle/content distinction itself, 
                                                 
v Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of the need to clarify these matters at the outset. 
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at least in the case of sensory perceptionvi. Consideration of such arguments is 
beyond the scope of the present treatment. 
 
I begin, then, by rehearsing (sections 3-5) the three main dynamic/enactive 
(‘processing loop’) arguments for ECM. 
 
3. Sensorimotor Loops and Variable Neural Correlates 
 
Noë (2004) suggests that in some way it is the shape of the whole sensorimotor 
loop that determines the character and content of perceptual (e.g. visual) 
experience. In developing this view he is pursuing the so-called ‘enactive’ 
approach according to which perceptual experience is enacted via an agent’s 
skilled sensorimotor behaviour (Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 1991). 
According to the enactivist, ‘Perception is not something that happens to us or 
in us, it is something we do’ (Noë 2004, p. 1). The role of actual activity in 
these accounts is not, however, straightforward. For it is not activity itself, so 
much as the know-how that drives the activity, that ultimately plays the crucial 
role. Perceptual experience, so the story goes, gains its content and character 
courtesy of the exercise of sensorimotor know-how, that is courtesy of the 
active deployment of implicit knowledge of the relations between (typically) 
movement and sensory stimulation. Thus Noë writes that: 
 
perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of 
bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we 
know how to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do … we 
enact our perceptual experience: we act it out. (Noë 2004, p. 1)  
 
As (partial) evidence for this view, Noë (2004) points to work involving Tactile 
Visual Sensory Substitution (TVSS) systems: work pioneered by Bach y Rita 
and colleagues (Bach y Rita, 1972). For a review, see Bach y Rita and Kercel 
(2003). In this well-known work, blind subjects are fitted with head- or 
eyeglass- mounted cameras that feed visual information to a small array of 
tactile stimulators mounted on the back (in the original work) or to a tiny 
electrically enabled tongue-pad (in the most recent versions). After a while, 
subjects report that the tactile sensations fade, to be replaced with quasi-visual 
ones able to support behaviours such as reflex ducking when a ball or other 
                                                 
vi This is because they hold that “some of the objects of perception….are constituents of the experience” 
(Martin 2004, p. 39). Notice that this claim goes beyond the more standard ‘direct realist’ suggestion that when 
we perceive the world we do so without first perceiving something inner. The direct realist view is compatible 
with what Foster (2000) nicely dubs psychological (as opposed to perceptual) mediation. For some useful 
discussion see Millar (2007). 
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object is thrown towards the head. Importantly for the enactivist, learning 
about newly enabled sensorimotor loops (learning a set of ‘sensorimotor 
dependencies’, to use the terminology of Noë (2004), linking motor actions to 
new sensory stimulations) turns out to be crucial to success. It is only when a 
subject begins to learn about the ways actively moving the camera yields 
systematic changes in tactile input that the experience begins to seem ‘quasi-
visual’ (e.g. she  begins to experience looming). The agent’s experience then 
ceases to feel (only) like touch and starts to feel like vision. Such results lead 
Noë to a very strong claim. This is the claim that: 
 
In general, what determines phenomenology is not neural activity set up 
by stimulation as such, but the way the neural activity is embedded in 
sensorimotor dynamic. (Noë 2004, p. 227) 
 
This ‘embedding’ is said to have far-reaching consequences for the 
philosophical and scientific understanding of consciousness: 
 
The enactive approach seeks to explain the quality of perceptual 
consciousness not as a neural function caused by and realized in the 
brain…but rather in terms of patterns and structures of skillful activity. 
On the enactive approach brain, body and world work together to make 
consciousness happen […] Experience is not caused by and realized in 
the brain, although it depends causally on the brain. Experience is 
realized in the active life of the skillful animal.  (Noë 2004, p. 227) 
 
Following Noë, we may dub this the rejection of ‘neural sufficiency’. But such a 
rejection, I suggest, cannot be justified on the basis of the TVSS (and related) 
evidence. It cannot be thus justified because it depends on taking evidence for 
the role of whole sensorimotor loops in training and tuning the neural systems 
that support conscious perception for evidence of the ongoing role of such 
loops, or even just of implicit knowledge of such loops, in conscious 
perception itself. Nothing in the evidence makes a case for the latter claims. 
The evidence thus leaves open the possibility that embodied activity is just a 
causal precondition of the setting or re-setting of parameters in neural 
populations: parameters that, once set, suffice for the activation of those neural 
populations to bring about the experience in question (Block, 2005).  
 
There is a subtler move possible hereabouts, and one that is pursued by Hurley 
and Noë (2003) and by Hurley (forthcoming). This move attempts to erode the 
importance of the training/post-training distinction by focusing not on the 
most local mechanism of occurrent experience itself, but rather upon the best 
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explanation of the quality and character of the experience. The suggestion is thus 
that we shift attention from what Hurley dubs the ‘sufficiency question’ (e.g. 
‘what is the system within which a certain pattern of activity suffices for an 
experience of visual looming?’) to an explanatory one (in this case ‘why is this 
neural state the neural correlate of the experience of visual looming?’). Thus 
suppose we return to the example of TVSS. Following Hurley and Noë, we 
may suppose that after training and adaptation, at least some different neural 
regions are now implicated in the reconstituted ‘visual’ processing. Given such 
an outcome, we may reasonably ask what it is that standard vision and TVSS-
supported vision have in common? But the answer, they suggest, is not 
apparent from the neural data alone. Instead, what they have in common is 
their ability to support what Hurley (forthcoming) describes as  ‘a characteristic 
extended dynamic ’: a distributed process involving brain, body and the active 
probing of the world. It is this sameness of extended dynamic pattern, Hurley 
argues, that best explains the sameness of experiential quality. So even if 
activity in the neural stuff alone suffices (after training) for the experience, our 
explanations of the visual-qualitative nature of the experience need to look 
further afield. 
  
But this version of the argument, though it avoids the previous worry, then 
fails to provide any support for ECM. To see this, consider that even standard 
teleosemantic forms of representationalismvii (which identify contents, even 
when neurally encoded, by what they are about) could avail themselves of this 
argument to place various neural states into a content-based equivalence class. 
Such a result is interesting, but falls far short of undermining standard 
internalist views about the local (neural) vehicles of content. Or suppose what 
matters is the achieved functional poise of a representational state? Then the 
very same content and the very same poise might be neurally supported in a 
variety of ways (perhaps, as in TVSS, reflecting their recruitment via different 
gross input channels). But once again, there would be no threat posed to 
standard views about the location or nature of the machinery of mind.  
 
But perhaps there is something special about the specific application of the 
variable neural correlates argument to the case of perceptual experience? 
Hurley and Noë (2003) claim that in this arena their view has a clear advantage 
over representational ones, since: 
 
 when it is brought to our attention that certain sensorimotor 
contingencies are characteristic of vision … it [becomes] intelligible why 
                                                 
vii Classic examples include Dretske (1981) and Millikan (1984). 
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it is like seeing rather than hearing to perceive in a way governed by the 
sensorimotor contingencies characteristic of vision rather than [those of] 
audition. (Hurley and Noë 2003, p. 146) 
 
The idea here is that learning that some neural activity pattern P in area Q 
correlates with visual experience leaves us wondering why: why does all that 
support visual (rather than e.g. tactile) experience. By contrast, it is argued: 
 
when the sensorimotor pattern characteristic of vision is explained, we 
have an ‘aha’ reaction; we see through the dynamic pattern of 
sensorimotor contingency to what vision in particular is like. (Hurley and 
Noë 2003, p. 160) 
 
But this threatens to underestimate the resources of the standard approach 
(and, correlatively, to overestimate those of the proposed alternative). For a 
good neurocentric account need not just nominate an area or activity pattern as 
the neural correlate of an experience or type of experience and leave it at that. 
It may also make clear why, given that (for example) such and such information 
is now functionally poised in such and such a way, the agent will tend to say 
and do the very things they tend to say and do: the very things characteristic of, 
for example, seeing not hearing. Such behaviours may include reporting 
looming, ducking on receipt of incoming-baseball-specifying visual 
information, and so on. Such a result would merit at least a mild ‘aha’! It might 
be thought nonetheless to fall short (though see Dennett (1991) for a famous 
rejection of this alleged shortfall) of explaining why visual experience has the 
specific qualitative character it has. But the enactive/variable neural correlates 
story is equally silent on this very point, as Hurley and Noë (2003) candidly 
admit.  
 
I conclude that there is nothing in the simple commitment to enactivism (or in 
its more epistemologically spun cousin, the Variable Neural Correlates 
argument) that supports ECM. 
 
4. Virtual Representations 
 
A second kind of argument meant to favour ECM takes as its starting point 
some well-established facts (for a handy review, see Stafford and Webb (2005, 
p. 38-42)) concerning the limits of here-and-now perceptual uptake. For 
example, the visual pick-up of colour information does not extend to the edge 
of our visual contact with world, since the colour sensitive cells are almost all in 
the densely photoreceptor populated central high resolution fovea (although 
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brightness can be detected all the way out, and sometimes we get colour cues 
from that). In addition, visual sensitivity to detail is high only in that small 
foveal window. Yet, as Dennett (1991) and others note, we do not experience 
the world as only detailed and coloured in the middle! Why not?  
 
One possible answer is that the scene appears coloured and detailed ‘all the way 
out’ because we mistake easy accessibility for actual encoding. Thus we 
implicitly know that we can retrieve colour information and finer and finer 
detail at will, just by moving our heads and eyes so as to scan the scene via a 
series of rapid eye movements known as saccades.  The most common way to 
unpack this suggestion is to suggest that the visual experience of richness of 
detail etc is illusory: we think we experience rich detail (etc) but we do not 
(Dennett, 1969, 1991; Ballard, 1991; O’Regan, 1992; Churchland et al, 1994). 
Instead, we simply represent to ourselves the fact that the scene is full of 
accessible detail. 
 
But an alternative (and for present purposes more interesting) account suggests 
that the experienced richness is not an illusion at all. Rather, the correct lesson 
(it is argued) is that our perceptual experience is determined not just by the 
current neural encodings and activity but by the combination of those encodings 
and activity, our own capacities for saccadic action, and the actual detail of the 
external scene (Noë, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2008). The colour, detail etc, is (as Noë 
puts it) ‘virtually represented’: 
 
the world is present in experience virtually, the way information from a remote 
server is present on your desktop. The world is present virtually thanks to the 
way we are bound to it, in bodies with the right sort of networked 
connections. The flick of the eye, the turn of the head, the movement of 
the body, brings us the detail we need as we need it. The world is present 
virtually thanks to our online, dynamic access to it. (Noë  2007, ms p. 15) 
 
The idea once again is that visual experience is enacted, insofar as it is partially 
constituted by our actions and by the world we act in. The best explanation of 
our experiences of detail (etc), so the argument goes, is that such experiences, 
just as ECM requires, are not determined by inner neural activity alone.  
 
There is, however, a problem. For as Noë himself notes the remote server 
analogy is not necessarily a good tool for securing this conclusion. It seems to 
suggest that ‘experience has this content only as a potentiality’ (Noë 2007, p. 
15). But mere potentialities of experience are surely not what is at issue 
between the friends and foes of ECM. The target is experience itself, and the 
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question is, what are the local physical goings-on that determine the nature of 
that (actual, not potential) experience? Here, Noë makes an interesting but 
ultimately rather puzzling suggestion. He suggests that (unlike in the computer 
case) ‘you cannot factor experience into an occurrent and a merely potential 
part’ (Noë 2007, p. 16) since: 
 
Pick any candidate for the occurrent factor. Now consider it. It is 
structured too; it has hidden facets or aspects too. It is present only in 




... this is perhaps the most important idea in this paper, experiential 
presence is virtual all the way in. This is an important disanalogy with the 
computer case. (Noë 2007, p. 16) 
 
Thus it is agreed on all sides that we seem to see colour all the way out, but that 
our here-and-now pick up is more limited. But now, Noë (2007) suggests, try 
and attend to (for example) just that part of the colourful shirt you have in true 
(occurrent, here-and-now) foveal view.  It will turn out that that part of the 
visual scene too has structure, and hence (according to Noë) that it seems as it 
does only because you can attend to its parts as needed too. And so on all the 
way in, whatever location and feature you choose. Experience, Noë claims, is 
thus ‘virtual all the way in’. So unlike in the computer case, there is no contrast 
between what is truly experienced (what is already locally encoded, as it were) 
and what is experienced in virtue of potentialities (what is available by online 
dynamic access). 
 
I confess to being unsure how to understand this argument. The original ‘mere 
potentialities’ version of the virtual representation story strikes me as generally 
plausible (Clark, 2002), but it does not (as Noë seems to admit) actually support 
ECM. The trickier ‘virtual all the way in’ version attempts to avoid this 
shortfall, but does so (it seems to me) at the cost of considerable obscurity. Is 
the claim just that we can always attend to, and hence bring into experience, 
more detail? If so, it is not at all clear why that supports anything like ECM. Is 
it perhaps that what fixes any experience is not a snapshot moment of neural 
activity but a process extended in time? That sounds plausible (and we shall 
return to it later). But then – at least at first pass - all that seems to matter is 
that the neural activity evolve over time in such-and-such a way. In which case 
the machinery of conscious experience is all in the head, with the proviso that 
the head persists over time and that the neural encoding evolve in a certain 
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way. This too falls far short of establishing ECM. As it stands, the ‘virtual all 
the way in’ version of the argument is either flawed or simply too opaque to 
carry the weight required. 
 
I conclude that the appeal to virtual representing fails as an argument for ECM.  
 
5.  Dynamic Entanglement 
 
This brings us to the last (and most promising) of the current arguments for 
ECM: the argument from dynamic entanglement. The starting point for this 
argument is the idea (increasingly influential in the sciences of mind) that we 
should, in many cases, resist the temptation to think in terms of a simple linear 
flow in which the senses deliver input which is progressively processed and 
refined until an output (usually a motor action) is selected, and the process 
repeats. This picture (which Hurley (1998) dubs the Input-Output Picture) has 
been challenged on many groundsviii but the key observation is that motor 
processing and perceptual uptake each unfold courtesy of a mass of ongoing 
looping interactions in which recurrent neural circuitry and bodily action 
combine so as the active agent structures the information flow in ways apt to 
the task (for more on the self-structuring of information flows, see Lungarella 
and Sporns (2005) and Clark (2008)).  
 
An alternative to the simple input-output model thus stresses the looping 
dynamics of the processing, describing cognitive mechanisms in which 
‘information flows back as it flows up, and it flows more or less continuously’ 
(Hardcastle 1998, p. 341). The physical vehicles are, on these accounts, 
sometimes extended dynamic loops connecting ‘higher’ to ‘lower’ brain areas, 
and encompassing both ‘cognitive’ and ‘motor’ systems, (see also Clark (1997)). 
Clark (1999) dubs this alternative vision  ‘Escher Spaghetti’ where this names a 
seething mass comprising not just multiple criss-crossing strands (ordinary 
spaghetti), but strands whose ends feed back into their own (and others) 
beginnings, making ‘input’ and ‘output’, and ‘early’ and ‘late’ into imprecise and 
misleading visions of complex recurrent and reentrant dynamics.  
 
To turn these kinds of observations about complex neural dynamics and active 
perception into an argument for ECM, however, we need to add some further 
ingredients. In particular, we need to combine the picture of complex looping 
processes with the claim that the conscious-experience supporting loops 
(providing the non-instrumental minimal necessary supporting structure for at 
                                                 
viii See the discussion in Hardcastle (1998). For a review, see Clark (2001) chapter 5. 
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least some forms of conscious experience) are those running (not just within 
the brain but) through brain, extra-neural body, and perhaps even world. 
Versions of just such an argument appear in Hurley (1998), Thompson and 
Varela (2001), Noë and Thompson (2004a,b), Noë (2008), and Cosmelli and 
Thompson (forthcoming). Thus Thompson and Varela write that: 
 
[W]e conjecture that consciousness depends crucially on the manner in 
which brain dynamics are embedded in the somatic and environmental 
context of the animal’s life, and therefore that there may be no such 
thing as a minimal internal neural correlate whose intrinsic properties are 
sufficient to produce conscious experience. (Thompson and Varela 
2001, p. 425) 
 
In just this vein Cosmelli and Thompson (forthcoming) argue that the 
contributions of the (non-neural) body are so important and complexly 
intertwined with the neural processing itself that we cannot simply ‘carve off’ 
the neural elements from the rest. The root cause of this is supposed to involve 
a certain kind of dynamic complexity sometimes known (Clark, 1997, 2002; 
Wheeler, 2005) as continuous reciprocal causation. This kind of complexity is 
found in ‘dense nonlinear systems where all state variables interact with each 
other, any change in an individual variable becomes inseparable from the state 
of the entire system’ Cosmelli and Thompson (forthcoming). Cosmelli and 
Thompson offer lots of neat examples of this kind of complexity, but the 
central idea emerges most clearly in the following (rather long) passage: 
 
[the examples]  are intended to stress the immense complexity of the 
neural and extraneural interactions that ultimately determine brain 
activity in the living organism. The list of functional systems dependent 
on brain-body coupling to provide the organism with coherent 
perception of the world also includes the entire interoceptive, autonomic 
system … vestibular-autonomic regulation … balance and somatic 
graviception relying on hydrostatic properties of blood pressure and 
inertial mass of abdominal viscera … , as well interaction between the 
senses occurring at both central and peripheral levels. (Cosmelli and 
Thompson, forthcoming, ms p. 12) 
 
Experiences of emotion, to take just one possible example, are sometimes said 
to depend on highly complex, temporally extended processes looping between 
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brain and the extra-neural body (Varela, 1999; Thompson and Varela, 2001)ix. 
But once we accept that kind of model for the experience of emotion, it seems 
a small step to accepting it for the experience of seeing, and thus extending the 
relevant loops out into the wider world. Thus work in ‘active’ and ‘animate’ 
vision (Ballard et al, 1997) stresses the role of bodily acts (such as head motions 
and saccades) and the persisting real-world scene in visually-based problem 
solving. Does visual experience itself, as ECM suggests, depend non-
instrumentally on such body- and world- involving processing loops? 
 
On the face of it, the answer is ‘no’, or at least, ‘not proven’. For intuitively, 
visual experience may at each moment depend solely on the complex brain 
activity caused (instrumentally) by the ongoing engagements with body and 
world. The same might be said for the case of emotion, if various body-
involving loops matter only insofar as they ‘report back’ to the brain and CNS. 
The ‘dynamic entanglement’ arguments for ECM do not, however, stop there. 
For there is one more move to be considered, and it is (it seems to me) the 
crucially important one. It concerns the vexed question of temporal spread. 
 
 
Suppose that we reject what Noë (2004, p. 35-39) calls the ‘snapshot picture’ of 
visual experience, as fully determined by brain states at some moment in time, 
and instead suggest that it is processes that suffice for conscious experience and 
that these processes essentially evolve in time? In that case, there may seem 
room for certain forms of looping (body and world involving) engagement to 
play a constitutive rather than an instrumental role. According to such a view: 
 
                                                 
ix But notice that here too (recall section 2 above) we need to be wary of the exact claim that is at issue. For 
while it may be compelling to conceive of certain emotions as essentially priming bodily responses to threats, 
dangers, risks etc (and of the experience of touch, to take another such example, as in some way essentially 
bodily) it is by no means evident that the most local material vehicles of emotional experience (or touch) 
involve processing loops that extend beyond the brain/CNS. Thus Jesse Prinz, in a recent treatment entitled ‘Is 
Consciousness Embodied’ writes that: 
 
The claim that consciousness extends into the body is only marginally more plausible than the claim 
that consciousness leaks out into the world.  We have never found any cells outside the brain that are 
candidates as correlates for experience.  Such cells would have to co-vary with conscious states in 
content and time course.  Every component of the body that we can experience is represented in the 
brain, and when the corresponding brain areas are damaged experience is lost.  Conversely, bodily 
experience can continue after the body is damage, as in the case of phantom limb pain.  There is, in 
short, little reason to think the correlates of experience extend beyond the cranium. (Prinz 2008, p.  
425) 
 
What I am calling the ‘processing-loop versions’ of ECM aim to provide just such reasons. It is these 
arguments that are at issue in the present treatment. 
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experience … is a temporally extended skill-based activity, comparable 
to the playing of a game, or a dance. … There’s no such thing as my 
experience at an instant in time. At a given time I can report on my 
experience. But what I do then is not record my state at that instant, but 
report on the evolution of my engagement with my surroundings at that 
instant. Experience is a temporally extended activity essentially. (Noë 
2008, p. 460) 
 
The upshot of all this, according to Noë, is nothing less than ECM itself, viz, 
that ‘it is not the brain alone … that suffices for experience’ (Noë 2006, p. 420). 
 
Does ECM really follow? The best test of this view is still the ‘twin test’ 
mentioned in connection with the arguments for EM and active externalism 
rehearsed in section 1 above. Thus take a here-and-now neural duplicate of you 
and ask; Would the duplicate, instantaneously ushered into being by, let us 
imagine, some quantum accident, share your experiential state? The answer, if 
the ‘temporal spread’ considerations are correct, must be ‘no’. Indeed, Noë 
suggests that a negative answer to this question follows pretty much directly 
from an enactivist conception of perception: 
 
I have urged that experience is a temporally extended phenomenon; it is 
an activity of skillful probing. If this is right, then a neural duplicate of me 
now, at a moment in time, won’t, by dint of being my duplicate now, have any 
experience at all. If the duplicate does have experience, it will be thanks to 
its dynamic, temporally extended interaction with the environment. But then again 
we must note that there is little reason to think that its experience would 
or could be like mine unless its environment were also like mine. (Noë 
2006, p. 420, my emphasis) 
 
Suppose we agree (as seems independently plausible) that there will be no 
experience without some temporal evolution of brain states. We thus agree that 
for information to become conscious, some amount of time needs to pass, so 
that normally there is no way the brain can ‘in an instant’ reach the kind of state 
that supports conscious experience. This fact alone does not mandate ECM. 
For it might still be the case that what normally takes time is for activation to 
build up (perhaps courtesy of recurrent neural circuitry (Lamme, 2006; Block, 
2007)) until some kind of threshold is passed. If that were so, whatever builds 
up during the normal time frame might still be extraordinarily ushered into 
being by our quantum accident. This kind of role for temporal evolution is thus 
fully compatible with both a neuro-internalist and essentially snapshot 
conception of the physical underpinnings of conscious experience. We can 
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even relax, if we wish, the snapshot element here while retaining the 
internalism. Thus imagine that even once the right kind of activation state is 
reached, the state still needs to persist for a while for a conscious percept (say) 
to be experienced. Even so, that still gives us no reason (yet) to look outside 
the brain for the sufficient material substrate of the experience. 
 
But perhaps the point is that the neural states, to support a given experience, 
need not just to persist but to evolve, over time, in some specific way? Here 
too it is tempting to defend the internalist intution, by arguing that whatever 
this signature evolution may be, it is surely an evolution of neural states, and so 
all we need to do is magnify our quantum accident so as to bring about that 
very same state evolution to ensure (purely internally) that the experience 
occurs. Once again, the minimal substrate of the conscious experience looks to 
be attainable regardless of the states of the extra-neural body or extra-bodily 
world. 
 
It is at this point that things become murky, and interesting. For, as Hurley 
(1998) points out, it is open to the naturalistically inclined philosopher to reject 
the thought experiment as an indicator of the minimal circuitry of experience. 
Perhaps some specific experiences (not all experiences, let us suppose, but 
some) require a kind of ‘signature’ temporal evolution of neural states that 
simply cannot (in the natural order) occur in the absence of the right extra-
neural scaffolding. Thus consider, as a rough parallel, the case of a large 
orchestra that cannot play quite like that without the conductor (for ECM the 
‘conductor’ is, of course, the loops via body and world). In this vein Noë 
suggests that: 
 
… perhaps the only way – or the only biologically possible way – to 
produce just the flavor sensation one enjoys when one sips a wine is by 
rolling a liquid across one's tongue. In that case, the liquid, the tongue, 
and the rolling action would be part of the physical substrate for the 
experience's occurrence. (Noë 2004, p. 220) 
 
Similarly, perhaps the rich visual scene can never look quite like that unless you 
are really acting and behaving in the world. Would this be constitutive or 
merely instrumental dependence? I do not think the answer is clear-cut. But at 
this point we have at least isolated what seems to be the only plausible 




(DEUTS: Dynamic Entanglement plus Unique Temporal Signature 
Argument) 
 
Deep Dynamic Entanglement + Unique Temporal Signature = ECM 
 
 
The ‘dynamic entanglement plus unique temporal signature’ argument 
(henceforth DEUTS) captures most of what Cosmelli and Thompson (in press) 
say about profound bodily involvement in the construction of experience, and 
of what Noë (2004, 2007, 2008) says about worldly involvement. Should it 




6. Some Common Responses 
 
One common but unconvincing, response to these arguments for ECM 
involves the appeal to the ‘brain in a vat’x. Take whatever neural system you 
favor (the neural circuitry of the brain perhaps, or of the brain plus CNS). 
Keep it alive in a bath of nutrients, and provide it with inputs that faithfully 
simulate the energetic patterns that impinge on normal embodied, situated 
brains, and monitor its outputs so as to alter the contents of the simulation 
accordingly (allowing it to act upon and alter states of the simulated 
environment). For all we know, so the argument goes, we might be such brains, 
unknowingly envatted, and apparently acting on the world around us, 
apparently deploying yellow sticky notes, rolling wines across our tongue, using 
notebooks, etc. Does this not show that there can be no constitutive 
involvement for physical machinery beyond the bounds of the brain/CNS? 
 
The problem with this argument is that it proves too much. To see this, 
imagine a variant case (Clark, 2008) in which a partially lesioned brain is 
envatted, and in which the helpful scientists use a cleverly (deep-neurally) 
hooked-up vat to fill in the usual contribution from neural motion area MT. 
The envatted agent now experiences motion. Presumably, this having of 
motion experience ‘by the envatted brain’ would not then show that activity in 
MT is not part of the normal physical substrate of motion experience! The 
mistake, then, is to infer that the sufficient mechanism is the biological stuff 
                                                 
x This thought experiment is discussed in, for example, Smith (1984) and Brueckner (1986). An especially 




alone, just because the biological stuff, in the special vat-context, helps support 
thinking and experience. At the limit of this thought experiment we have the 
single neuron in a dizzyingly complex vat (Wilson and Clark, 2008). We would 
not conclude that experience and thought constitutively depend only on the 
activity of that single neuron! 
 
The trouble, in short, is that the intelligent vat (as deployed against ECM) is 
here asked to do all the complex work of body, action, and world (Hurley 
(forthcoming); Noë, 2004). This leads to a kind of dilemma. If the vat does not 
fill in everything the world provides, the experiment is unfair. If it does, it 
cannot prove anything, as the filled in contributions might (as in the case of the 
vat-repair of MT) still be essential for that very experience. The same 
considerations apply to all cases where a full simulation recreates every effect of 
bodily motion, somatic signaling etc, thus building in every functional effect of 
the world and body anyway (Noë, 2007; Cosmelli and Thompson, 
forthcoming). The brain-in-a-vat considerations are thus unable to advance the 
argument. 
 
Another common, but equally inadequate, response to arguments for ECM is 
to point out that we can sometimes have experiences without the usual 
involvement of the body and world. This is strikingly so in the case of dreams, 
or when the probing neurosurgeon stimulates bits of tissue causing us to hear 
the opening bars of a symphony, smell the jasmine and madre de la noche from 
an old Andalucian holiday, etc. Thus (so the argument goes) since some 
experience does not need the active body and the wider world, maybe no 
experience does? Clearly, this is an unwarranted conclusion. To see this, we 
need only note that just because some of my experience does not involve e.g. 
auditory cortex, that does not mean that none of it ever does! Worse still, the 
cases where we do have the active body and wider world ‘in the loop’ way 
outnumber the others.  
 
Nor does it help simply to discover neural correlates of conscious experience, 
be they ever so fine-grained. Thus suppose we find all manner of interesting 
neural correlates for specific kinds of conscious experience. Suppose even that 
these correlates can be tracked as they evolve moment-by-moment sensitively 
linking brain activity to the agent’s unfolding experience.  For example, Schyns 
et al (2007) use EEG signals to track (moment-by-moment) the key state 
transitions in the brain as different bodies of information (those specifying 
‘nuns’ versus ‘Voltaire’ in the two visual interpretations of the famous 
ambiguous picture) are processed, one step at a time, in the brain. The upshot 
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is a compelling picture of the evolution and significance of the crucial neural 
processes over time.  
 
What follows regarding ECM? Not much, it seems. For all this neural activity 
delicately unfolds in the presence of the ambiguous picture itself. So how do 
we know that the picture and our saccades around it do not form part of the 
minimal sufficient machinery for that very experience? Those who reject ECM 
assert that the picture and saccades merely drive the brain through a sequence 
of states, but that the brain processes themselves provide the sufficient 
machinery of the experience. By contrast, those who embrace ECM claim that 
there is no good reason, independent of our neurocentric prejudices, to make 
the cut between essential ongoing causal ‘drive’ (recall Noë’s case of the taste of 
the wine and the rolling of the liquid over the tongue) and experience-
sustaining machinery at that very point. Since we cannot (given our earlier 
argument) invoke the experience of the brain-in-a-vat to support the standard 
causal/constitutive cut, how are we to resolve this? 
 
We do not make progress by simply asserting that the cut be made at the 
brain/body (or even organism/world) boundary. Nor do we make progress by 
simply conflating, as proponents of ECM sometimes do, the notions of causal 
drive and essential machinery themselves. Noë sometimes looks to be guilty of 
this error, in passages such as these: 
 
According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the 
environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (Noë 
2006, p. 411, my emphasis) 
 
if ever there was a plausible candidate for a psychological state that is 
driven and so partially constituted by the environment, it is perceptual 
consciousness. (Noë  2008, p. 460, my emphasis) 
 
But this misrepresents, or at any rate uncomfortably oversimplifies, the Clark 
and Chalmers argument for EM. For Clark and Chalmers nowhere suggest that 
just because X drives Y, X becomes partially constitutive of Y. That would 
indeed be to make a ‘causal-constitutive’ or ‘coupling-constitutive’ error 
(Adams and Aizawa, 2008; Block, 2005). Just because my TV picture is 
sensitively driven by the incoming signal, that does not make the transmitter 
part of the minimal sufficient physical substrate for that very picture (not even 
as the picture evolves over time). Rather, in the Clark and Chalmers argument 
for EM, everything depends on the precise way X and Y together function to 
control behavior (the way, we argued, distinctive of dispositional believing). We 
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should thus reject any arguments (for EM or ECM) that merely conflate causal 
drive and essential phenomenon-producing machineryxi. For they secure ECM 
only at the cost of a radically unconvincing general principle (that to sensitively 
drive some X is to be part of the machinery in virtue of which X obtains). 
 
At this point in the dialectic, a deep stalemate beckons. Just because OUTER 
drives BRAIN, and BRAIN depends (let us assume) on OUTER to step 
through the signature sequence of states that support some specific experience, 
that does not yet show that OUTER is part of the minimal machinery of 
experience. But nor can we simply claim the opposite (given the failure of the 
standard vat-style thought experiments) except as an expression of our pre-
existing prejudices.  
 
7. Keeping Joy In Its Place 
 
There is one final set of considerations, however, that may yet begin to 
untangle these argumentative kitestrings. The considerations concern timing  
(again) and bandwidth. Thus Chalmers (2008) suggests that arguments for EM 
may fail to generalize to ECM and that: 
 
Perhaps part of the reason is that the physical basis of consciousness 
requires direct access to information on an extremely high-bandwidth 
[… ] our low-bandwidth conscious connection to the environment 
seems to have the wrong form as it stands. (Chalmers 2008, p. xii-xii) 
 
Chalmers (2008) does not develop this suggestion, but the direction seems 
promising. Perhaps conscious awareness is special among cognitive functions 
insofar as it requires (in us humans at least) certain information-accessing and 
information-integrating operations whose temporal scale makes neural 
(brain/CNS) processes (just as a matter of contingent fact, in us humans) the 
only adequate ‘vehicle’. (Note that the Clark/Chalmers case for EM, by 
contrast, targets only non-conscious mental states and processes, where long-
term informational poise (rather than online informational access and 
integration) seems to be what counts). 
 
As a conjecture about the physical roots of conscious experience, this view has 
some plausibility. Thus the philosopher and neuroscientist Chris Eliasmith 
(2008) suggests that the dynamics internal to the brain are ‘qualitatively 
                                                 
xi Adams and Aizawa suggest that the Clark and Chalmers arguments for EM are equally guilty of this 
conflation. I respond in more detail to this charge elsewhere (Clark, 2007, 2008) and will not further repeat 
those arguments here. 
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different’ from those that span the brain-world boundary and that the key 
differences involve speed and bandwidth: 
 
The most obvious differences [between neural and super-neural 
dynamics] are the speed of information flow (i.e., bandwidth), and the degree and 
kind of coupling.  Because bodies have mass, they tend to slow down the 
transfer of information to the world from the brain (i.e. they effectively act as a 
low-pass filter). However, no such impediment to information flow exists between 
brain areas. This results in a huge difference between the kinds of 
coupling that can be supported between brain subsystems and between 
the brain and the external environment. (Eliasmith 2008, p. 150, my 
emphasis) 
 
When does such a difference make a difference? Not, we can reasonably 
assume, in the case of non-occurrent states such as dispositional believingsxii. 
But it is plausible that speed (or fine temporal issues more generally) makes a 
crucial difference in the moment-by-moment construction of conscious 
experience itself. Thus suppose conscious experience requires cortical 
operations that involve extremely precise temporal resolutions, such as the 
synchronous activation of distinct neural populations where the required 
synchrony demands millisecond precision (for some of the evidence for this 
conjecture, see the review in Singer (2003)xiii)? This might be so, for example, if 
the brain uses fine temporal synchronization and fast signal processing to bind 
together sensibly coherent bodies of information. Or alternatively, as suggested 
by Thiele and Stoner (2003), and by Lamme and Spekreijse (1998), it may be 
that synchrony correlates with attention, and that attentional moduation is what 
allows information to pass from perceptual buffers to working memory in the 
way that gives rise to conscious experiencexiv.  
 
In all these cases, the fans of ECM will suggest that we are still studying only 
the neural component of the true substrate of experience. But perhaps we can now 
see a principled reason to be skeptical. In such cases the external environment 
may well matter insofar as it causally drives the neural systems, but the key 
effects that enable and explain the quality of the felt experience may be 
occurring at time-scales that are only possible within the neural apparatus itself. 
                                                 
xii Eliasmith (2008) presents the temporal considerations as a general reason to be skeptical of claims 
concerning true cognitive extension. But the empirical findings that best support the timing argument concern 
only the construction of conscious experience, and depend essentially upon the need for fine time-scale 
synchronies as a means of binding together bodies of neurally represented information. 
xiii Thus we read that ‘Cortical neurons can engage in oscillatory firing patterns…and synchronize their 
responses with millisecond precision over surprisingly large distances’. (Singer, 2003) 
xiv Thanks to Jesse Prinz for alerting me to this possibility. 
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If this were so then everything that involves subsequent motor responses or 
bodily actions (including active saccades around the scene) will be ‘screened 
off’ (by the bodily ‘low-pass filter’) from the neural/CNS mechanisms that 
actually produce the conscious experience. This is the key effect that may 
defeat the most promising argument (the DEUTS, ‘dynamic entanglement plus 
unique temporal signature’ argument) for ECM. It is worth pausing, then, to 
clarify the shape of the worry. 
 
A low-pass filter is any physical medium that allows low frequency signals 
through while reducing or blocking higher frequency signals. The walls of a 
room act as a low pass filter for sound. That is why you hear the low-frequency 
bass more than the high-frequency treble from the hi-fi when you are in the 
next room. Eliasmith’s interesting suggestion is that the extra-neural body, 
implicated in all cases of active vision and motor loops, acts as a kind of low 
pass filter for signals coming from the environment. What this means in 
practice is that for phenomena that depend on, for example, the very fast 
temporal binding or processing of signals, the only locus in which such 
operations can (as a matter of fact) occur lies within the brain/CNS. The 
muscles, for example, would act as a low pass filter, and activity there would 
thus fall outside the effective system within which signal binding or processing 
on the right timescale can occur. Muscular goings-on, if this is correct, could 
indeed be a source of inputs to the system that generates conscious experience 
(as they must be, given that we can experience muscular action) but they will 
not form part of the system upon which the experiences most locally depend. 
Muscular activity (like environmental signals in general) would thus be fit to 
play a causal rather than a constitutive role in the construction of experiencexv. 
 
This is actually quite an intuitive result. Thus Adams and Aizawa (2008) write, 
concerning arguments for the extended mind in general, that: 
 
The orthodox might listen to an argument for the view that cognition 
extends beyond the neurons of the brain into the spinal cord and 
                                                 
xv The same considerations apply in the case of another worry usefully raised by an anonymous referee. The 
worry is that ‘the way we hear ourselves speak contributes constitutively to the experience of speaking’ since it 
involves ‘both a sense of the movement of one’s vocal organs and of the sounds one thereby makes’. Once 
again, the key is to separate two forms of non-instrumental involvement for these bodily aspects. For it may 
well be that the sense of both movement and sound form essential aspects of the experience of hearing 
ourselves speak. But the question before us is whether the most local processing activity that suffices for that 
sense is itself spread out, or involves only neural encodings and operations. And the empirical story I have 
sketched offers a clear answer: the local operations that suffice for it seeming to the agent that she is moving 
her vocal organs and hearing her own voice are all staunchly contained within the neural apparatus, even 
though the signals that drive that apparatus are (unless she is hallucinating) rooted in peripheral bodily events. 
(See also note 7 above) 
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sensory nerves, but muscular cognition is beyond the pale. The standard 
assumption is that the kinds of cognitive information processing that 
take place in nerves are dramatically unlike those that occur in muscles. 
(Adams and Aizawa 2008, p. 19) 
 
The problem with this as an argument against EM is that we need to know 
what kind of difference is in question, and just why it makes a difference for the 
obtaining of some specific mental or cognitive state. It is not enough (as nicely 
argued by Wheeler (in press)) merely to note some difference or other, on pain 
of rapidly begging the question against the very possibility of non-neural 
components of cognitive processesxvi. But in the special case of arguments for 
ECM, we can begin to discharge this obligation. For if indeed the physical 
machinery of conscious experience requires fast time-scale operations and 
processing, and the non-neural body acts as a low pass filter preventing external 
(and internal muscular etc) signals from directly entering into such operations 
and processing, then such signals are fit to play only a causal role, driving the 
neural systems within which the right kinds of fast binding and processing can 
occur. In such cases one might have all manner of complex couplings without 
thereby producing an extended material base for conscious experience. 
Contrast the case (discussed at length in Clark (2007, 2008)) of the possible role 
of gesture in the process of reasoning. There seems no reason why slow time-
scale gestural events should not productively interact with faster time-scale 
neural ones so as to yield a special kind of coupled gestural-neural unfolding 
that is itself the distinctive physical engine of a certain kind of problem-solving. 
But within this coupled unfolding, the streaming contents of conscious 
experience would all depend constitutively only upon the neural processing 
itself.  The account on offer thus enables us to embrace the kinds of claim 
made by Noë and others to the effect that certain experiences may only come 
about due to the neural systems being driven, in some distinctive way, by 
external signals. But it does so without being forced to the conclusion that such 
external sources comprise part of the most local machinery that generates the 
conscious experience itself. The account thus offers a principled reason for 
making the causal/constitutive cut, in the special case of conscious experience, 
in an orthodox, non-extended, kind of wayxvii. 
 
8. Conclusions: Walking The Line 
                                                 
xvi Adams and Aizawa do try to provide such reasons, though (again, see Clark (2007,2008) for discussion) the 
reasons are unconvincing in the case of non-conscious mental states. 
xvii This result obtains only for standard human agents circa 2009. Future direct Brain-Machine Interfaces 
(Serruya et al, 2002) may change all this. Properly ‘jacked-in’ via some future fast, broad-bandwidth interface, 
we might yet expand the physical substrate of conscious experience itself. 
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Might the most local machinery whose activity is sufficient for conscious 
experience include more than the brain/CNS? We have explored a variety of 
‘processing loop’ based arguments meant to suggest this conclusion, and found 
them all wanting. The most promising such argument, DEUTS (the argument 
from dynamic entanglement plus unique temporal signature) fails in an 
especially revealing way. For if the empirical considerations advanced in the 
previous section are correct, then we can at least in principle walk the difficult 
line that the best arguments for ECM seek to challenge. For we can allow that 
at least some conscious experiences may have the precise qualitative nature they 
do only when the brain/CNS is being sensitively driven by the 
body/environment in a specific way, while still maintaining that the 
involvement of the body/environment is here merely causal rather than 
genuinely constitutive. We can do this in virtue of a specific but popular class 
of theories concerning the way the human brain constructs ongoing conscious 
experience. This is the class of theories that require fine-grained processes of 
temporal coordination to bind together, or otherwise process, sensibly coherent 
bodies of represented information. Should such theories (or indeed any others 
that have the same kinds of temporal implications) prove correct, DEUTS 
would fail. DEUTS, however, was the only promising argument for ECM. I 
conclude that the case for ECM is at best unproven and that the machinery of 
conscious experience is (probably) all in the head/CNSxviii. 
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